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This paper reviews the current EU policy framework in view of its impact on hydrogen and fuel cell
development. It screens EU energy policies, EU regulatory policies and EU spending policies. Key
questions addressed are as follows: to what extent is the current policy framework conducive to
hydrogen and fuel cell development? What barriers and inconsistencies can be identiﬁed? How can
policies potentially promote hydrogen and fuel cells in Europe, taking into account the complex
evolution of such a potentially disruptive technology? How should the EU policy framework be
reformed in view of a strengthened and more coherent approach towards full deployment, taking into
account recent technology-support activities?
This paper concludes that the current EU policy framework does not hinder hydrogen development.
Yet it does not constitute a strong push factor either. EU energy policies have the strongest impact on
hydrogen and fuel cell development even though their potential is still underexploited. Regulatory
policies have a weak but positive impact on hydrogen. EU spending policies show some inconsistencies.
However, the large-scale market development of hydrogen and fuel cells will require a new policy
approach which comprises technology-speciﬁc support as well as a supportive policy framework with a
special regional dimension.
& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The introduction of hydrogen in Europe’s energy system – as
envisaged by the Hydrogen Deployment Strategy and the
Implementation Plan (Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology
Platform, 2007) – will constitute a major change. As hydrogen
can be a carbon-neutral means to substitute fossil fuels, the
European Commission – in line with governments worldwide –
regards its further development and market introduction as
desirable (EC, 2007a). However, hydrogen cannot compete yet
with incumbent technologies, in particular not when it is derived
from renewable energies, and is still in its early stage of market
introduction.
The following paper takes on the well-established argument
that in early phases of business development and market
introduction innovations need a technology-speciﬁc support
scheme. Without such a speciﬁc support scheme, lock-in
effects of prevailing technologies (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985)
provide incentives to incremental innovation only, along
existing trajectories and, thus potentially disruptive technologies
such as hydrogen cannot emerge. The dominance of prevailingll rights reserved.
3250477300.
Wuppertal Institute and thetechnologies, the risk of being entrapped in a carbon lock-in
(Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006) or other large technological
system (Walker, 2000), potential diseconomies of scale (Isoard
and Soria, 2001), and the necessity to reach at least a critical mass
of production legitimize tailor-made support schemes for hydro-
gen. The European Union – in line with other governments
worldwide – has introduced speciﬁc support schemes such as the
joint technology initiative (JTI).
It is important to acknowledge, however, that due to its
distinct characteristics hydrogen will need a more complex
support scheme than renewables (Ros et al., 2007; Roads2HyCom,
2008). At least three elements constitute the distinct character of
hydrogen and fuel cells from a policy-related point of view:1. As hydrogen is an energy carrier (and not an energy source
such as wind) it not only needs infrastructure for its
production but also for its distribution.2. Unlike biofuels that can be blended into conventional gasoline
or diesel fuels or renewable energy which can be fed into the
electricity grid, hydrogen needs to be made compatible with
the existing energy infrastructure.3. The overall performance of hydrogen and fuel cells relies on
some weak links such as storage technology where technolo-
gical progress is crucial.
For those reasons it is unlikely that support and incentive
systems that have proven to be successful for renewable energies
R. Bleischwitz, N. Bader / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 5388–5398 5389will be sufﬁcient for the mid-term to long-term deployment of
hydrogen and fuel cells.
The paper proposes that hydrogen requires a comprehensive
support scheme which bridges the gap between the three
dimensions of (a) market requirements, (b) sustainability/climate
requirements and (c) hydrogen technology development. Such a
comprehensive support scheme will have to balance strategic
deployment on the one hand and openness and ﬂexibility on
the other—a balance which has been discussed with regard to
governance and economic policy by Bleischwitz (2007) and
Metcalfe (2003).
With its recently launched joint technology initiative, the EU
aims at establishing jointly with the European industry a tailor-
made support system for hydrogen and fuel cells and plans
to spend almost 1 billion h between 2008 and 2017 for these
technologies (New Energy World IG and EC, 2008; Council of the
European Union, 2008). However, neither the JTI nor previous EU
research spending on hydrogen and fuel cells will be analyzed in
this study. Going beyond the level of technology-speciﬁc support
schemes our paper undertakes a screening of the existing EU
policy framework with the aim of an impact analysis towards any
mass market development of hydrogen and fuel cells. It seeks
to identify barriers as well as inconsistencies and side-effects that
hinder the envisaged uptake of a hydrogen economy in Europe.
This is important because in European member states the policy
framework depends to a large part upon the EU level with
increasing importance of EU regulation (Pelkmans, 2006).
The EU sets targets for its Member States with regard to energy
efﬁciency or the share of renewable energy in electricity
production; it regulates the emission trading scheme (ETS) and
partly also the European markets for gas and electricity; it sets
minimum levels for energy taxation and subsidizes energy
technologies through its regional funds and research projects.
Shedding light on the impact of current EU policies is crucially
important for future hydrogen and fuel cell development in
Europe as well as in other regions. Our approach thus comple-
ments research on how policies shape technological change
towards sustainable energy, which has been done as ex-post
evaluation of US experiences (Norberg-Bohm, 2000), of renewable
energy sources in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) and of energy-efﬁciency technolo-
gies (Grubb and Ulph, 2002).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes EU energy
policies (ETS, energy efﬁciency, renewables) for they have a direct
impact on hydrogen and fuel cells as well as on competing
technologies. Section 3 deals with regulatory policies; those are
not directly related to hydrogen and fuel cells but have the
potential to hinder or promote the development of these
technologies (energy taxation, liberalization of the internal
market for gas and electricity). Section 4 analyzes EU spending
policies asking whether they might constitute a push factor for
hydrogen and fuel cell development. Finally, Section 5 draws
conclusions and gives recommendations for an enhanced policy
framework.2. EU energy policies
Since its early beginning in postwar Europe energy has always
played a prominent role in the European integration process. Two
of the three founding treaties established organizations which
dealt with energy supply: the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (1951) and the European Atomic Energy Community (1957).
In recent years, new policies have emerged as a response to
climate change (Lechtenbo¨hmer et al., 2005; Pelkmans, 2006). TheEU now has substantive power in several ﬁelds which are of direct
relevance for hydrogen and fuel cell development.
2.1. Energy efﬁciency policies
Energy efﬁciency (EE) regulations are normally designed to
decrease the energy intensity of an economy, i.e. to minimize ‘‘the
amount of energy used per unit GDP’’ (IEA, 1987). Fuel cells when
used with hydrogen are relatively energy efﬁcient (compared
with traditional gasoline-powered internal combustion engines).
Legislation on EE may therefore indirectly favour the development
and market introduction of fuel cells.
Since 2000, the Community has adopted several measures in
the ﬁeld of EE. Many legal instruments concern speciﬁc sectors
such as buildings and the labelling of precisely deﬁned products
such as household appliances or electric ovens. Two relatively
recent directives are already rather encompassing in their scope
and set a framework for nearly all sectors: The directive on energy end-use efﬁciency and energy services of
2005 sets the target that every member state must on average
improve by 1% its EE every year. These targets are indicative.
The Member States are relatively free to choose the instru-
ments by which they want to reach these goals (EC, 2006a). In 2005, the EU also adopted a directive on the ecodesign of
energy-using products. This directive applies in principle to any
energy-using product and aims to improve EE in the whole life
cycle of the product. The text provides for EE standards and
requirements for every stage of the production beginning with
the early design phase. The text itself does not set any binding
targets (EC, 2005a); this is done via processes at an adminis-
trative level.
Some legal texts refer explicitly to fuel cells. For instance, the EU
directive on combined heat and power mentions them as a
cogeneration technology (EC, 2004). However, even when fuel
cells are not directly mentioned in EU directives, the latter can still
have great impact on their market introduction. The before
mentioned ecodesign directive sets a framework for all energy-
using products (except for vehicles for transport) and therefore
also concerns fuel cells. In fact, progress in fuel cell technology in
some speciﬁc areas like small appliances has the potential to
further the development of fuel cells in other areas too, such as
transport. One should note, however, that standards need to be set
with a mid-term perspective in order to go beyond incremental
improvements and to attract ﬁnancing for the fuel cell business
which is yet to a large part SME based in Europe (Jacob et al.,
2005; Patterson, 2008).
In the coming years the EU is very likely to adopt more
ambitious legislation in the ﬁeld of EE. At its summit of March
2007, the EU has agreed on the target to save ‘‘20% of its energy
consumption compared to projections for 2020’’ (EC, 2007b).
According to EU estimates already half of this energy savings
target could be reached if the existing legislation was well
implemented and the promotional and dissemination activities
reached out to a high number of energy consumers. However, to
reach the remaining 10%, the Community will need to adopt and
implement new legislation (EC, 2005b)—which may facilitate the
market introduction of fuel cells assuming that a long-term
perspective beyond 2020 is taken into account.
With regard to further EE legislation it is interesting to see that
energy consumption has grown between 1990 and 2004 mainly
in two sectors and is expected to continue to grow in future:
electricity consumption (households and services demand more
electricity) and transport (freight and passenger transport). In the
R. Bleischwitz, N. Bader / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 5388–53985390latter, there have so far been relatively little EE improvements
(OECD/IEA, 2007).
Consequently, the European Commission proposed relatively
ambitious targets for the reduction of future transport emissions.
Its proposal stipulated that by 2012 the average emissions of
new cars sold in the EU shall not exceed 120g CO2/km (EC, 2007c).
The European Parliament endorsed in December 2008 not
only this benchmark but furthermore introduced a long-term
target of 95 g CO2/km for 2020 (EC, 2008a). Given that in 2004
the average emissions of new sold cars amounted to 163 g
CO2/km, this legislation will force car producers to make drastic
cuts in emissions and consequently substantial improvements
in EE.
To conclude, the EU has been relatively active in the ﬁeld of EE
in recent years. However, the implementation of EE legislation by
Member States has so far been insufﬁcient (EC, 2008b). Moreover,
new legislation will need to be adopted if the union is to reach its
20% goal by 2020 (Lechtenbo¨hmer et al., 2005; Business Europe,
2007). The European Commission has therefore announced in its
Second Strategic Energy Review that a more focused EE action
plan will be prepared (EC, 2008c). This development can beneﬁt
hydrogen and fuel cells which can be important means for
reaching higher EE standards especially if a perspective beyond
2020 is taken.
However, if any cost beneﬁt analysis would focus on ‘low
hanging fruits’ in the short term and not take into account
possible positive alternatives after the year 2020, hydrogen and
fuel cells may not be considered a priority. It is thus not only
uncertain whether the EU rhetoric will be followed by new
legislation and effective implementation at the national level but
also what impact on hydrogen and fuel cells this may have.
Looking ahead one may also conclude that EE policy may become
a powerful tool for fostering hydrogen and fuel cells in areas
where the potential for market penetration is huge (mobile
applications, auxiliary power, see Fri, 2003, p. 70 on that aspect of78.1
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Fig. 1. Share of renewable energies in gross electricity consumptioany disruptive technology) and where the environmental pressure
to act facilitates actions (e.g. public busses for urban areas).2.2. Renewable energy policies
Hydrogen is only as green as its energy source. As long as it is
produced via gas reforming or via electrolysis based on carbon-
intensive electricity, it may offer some minor carbon reduction
advantages, but will not signiﬁcantly curb carbon emissions
(Heiman and Solomon, 2007). The penetration of renewable
energy sources in the European energy system is therefore a
precondition for the sustainable use of hydrogen.
The EU set in 2001 the target of a 21% renewable energy share
of total electricity consumption by 2010 (Directive 2001/77/EC).
This follows a target set in 1997: increasing the share of renewable
energy sources to 12% of gross energy consumption. The current
status of renewable electricity production shows the following
ﬁgure, demonstrating implementation deﬁcits in some member
states (Fig. 1).
Based on current predictions, it seems very unlikely that
the 12% target of primary energy consumption or the target of a
21% share in electricity consumption can be reached by 2010
(EurObserv’Er, 2007, p. 73). However, at the EU Summit in March
2007, the EU leaders set the future threshold even higher agreeing
to meet 20% of their overall energy needs by the use of renewable
energy by 2020, a target which has been backed by the European
Parliament in December 2008 (EC, 2008a).
This shows that the EU does not lack the ambition to increase
the share of renewable energies. It has clearly stated its will to do
so. However, it clearly shows deﬁcits in the implementation of its
goals. Thus, the EU will probably fail with regard to its targets for
2010. One of the essential conditions of ‘green’ hydrogen
production is thus currently unlikely of being fulﬁlled. Yet, the
example of Germany which is four years ahead of its schedule21
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fees providing certainty about production costs – the EU targets
may be reached.
The conclusions for our paper is that the EU will have to better
monitor and enforce the implementation of the renewables
objectives at Member State level in order to comply with its
ambitious targets for 2010 and 2020. This will also require
dissemination and harmonization of those support mechanisms
that have proven to be successful (Jansen et al., 2005). It is difﬁcult
to imagine that the EU will be in excess of renewable energies by
2020 that can be utilized to produce hydrogen on a large scale.
Overcapacities may emerge in some regions (e.g. electric hydro-
power, windmills in Denmark, on islands or offshore). This has
two implications: Firstly, synergies between renewable energies,
electricity systems and hydrogen shall be exploited and, secondly,
at least for a transition period other options to produce hydrogen
(such as by-production in chemical industry or gas reforming)
seem more realistic (Steinberger-Wilckens and Tru¨mper, 2007;
Ros et al., 2007).2.3. The emission trading scheme
Emission trading is one of the so-called Kyoto mechanisms to
implement the reduction of green house gases (GHG). According
to economic theory an ETS reduces the costs of reaching a speciﬁc
emissions target by taking advantage of different marginal
abatement costs of the participating actors. Cost savings are
particularly big if mitigation costs differ signiﬁcantly between
sources covered by the scheme. The cost differences create an
incentive to trade. Given that hydrogen production can be done
via fossil fuels, the speciﬁc mechanisms of the EU ETS are of great
importance for its future market price.
Reforming of natural gas for instance is a widely used hydrogen
production process even though it cannot signiﬁcantly curb GHG
emissions. The widespread use of gas reforming is due to the
fact that many fossil fuel-based hydrogen production processes
are less costly than hydrogen production from renewable
energies. Yet, a well functioning ETS will increase the cost
of carbon-intensive production processes. Thus, potential low
carbon alternatives such as carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) would become more competitive (Fischedick et al., 2007).
CCS could decrease the well-to-tank CO2 emissions of hydrogen
production. Without a functioning ETS the related well-to-tank
costs, however, are signiﬁcantly higher than those of the carbon-
intensive alternatives (Wietschel et al., 2006). By putting a price
on carbon-intensive processes, an ETS could set incentives for low
carbon emitting hydrogen production processes such as those
derived from renewables or fossil fuel combustion combined with
CCS.
In view of internalising negative externalities the European
Union therefore designed a European Emissions Trading Scheme.
It started on 1 January 2005 based on the Directive 2003/87/EC
(Bleischwitz et al., 2007). The scheme speciﬁes two periods, the
ﬁrst from 2005–2007 and the second corresponding to the ﬁrst
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2008–2012. It is a
cap and trade system which initially only focuses on CO2. Its
implementation will, however, take place in different phases with
reviews and possibilities for its extension to additional gases and
sectors.
The ETS currently applies to combustion installations with a
rated thermal input above 20MW, mineral oil reﬁneries, coke
ovens, iron and steel production, cement production and pulp and
paper production. Around 12,000 installations take part in the
system which covers about 45% of total EU CO2 emissions.With regard to hydrogen the main question is to what extent
the EU ETS encourages a shift of investments towards more
sustainable energy supply systems, including potentially disrup-
tive technologies such as hydrogen and fuel cells. Existing analysis
reveals that the ETS partly encourages the uptake of climate-
friendly technologies by rewarding businesses investing in energy
efﬁciency and some green technologies turning their investments
into quick, short-term proﬁts. But given the uncertainties about
the development of hydrogen and fuel cells as well as other more
disruptive sustainable technologies, the ETS can hardly encourage
investments into long-term solutions. The risk of sunk costs, as
well as the coordination costs for many investors is still too high
(Mc Kinsey and Ecofys, 2005; Endres and Ohl, 2005). This bias in
favour of path-dependent and incremental innovation is aggra-
vated by the limited playing ﬁeld of the ETS: the automobile
industry and oil industry are not covered by the EU ETS.
Surrounded by those constraints, the EU ETS in its current form
does not yet provide enough incentives to embark on radically
new sustainable technologies such as hydrogen and fuel cells.
Instead of setting incentives for hydrogen development, the
ETS might at some point even hinder its development. It is very
likely that the ETS will in future also apply to hydrogen
production. In its communication ‘‘2020 by 2020, Europe’s climate
change opportunity’’ of January 2008 the Commission proposed a
major reform of the ETS (EC, 2008d): The ETS should apply to all important industrial emitters
 GHGs other than CO2 should be included in the ETS
 From 2013 onwards the whole power sector should be part of
the ETS
 EU-wide auctioning of allowances should increasingly replace
the national allocation plans which are currently in placeThe European Parliament has backed many points of this
proposal in its resolution of December 2008. The reformed ETS
will apply to almost all industrial emitters. The non-power sector
will have to buy at least 20% of its allowances on the market from
2013; this share will rise to at least 70% in 2020 (EC, 2008e).
Hydrogen production (e.g. in the chemical industry) would then
most likely fall under it too. Without speciﬁc provisions for the
advantages of hydrogen on a life-cycle basis, the ETS would thus
hinder (GHG-intensive) hydrogen production.
In contrast, options to facilitate the market introduction
of hydrogen and fuel cells are as follows: processes for hydrogen
production could be exempted from the ETS whereas nearly all
other industrial emitters may be included. However, GHG-
intensive hydrogen production should only be exempted from
the ETS for a certain time period needed to develop a market.
Once a market for hydrogen and fuel cells exists, hydrogen
production should be included in the ETS to promote less GHG-
intensive production processes. The allocation mechanism may on
the other hand be supportive to the hydrogen economy. A
company producing hydrogen at certain standards may be
entitled to additional free allowances (‘grandfathering’), taking
into account the GHG reduction via the application of hydrogen.
As a complementary mechanism, the funds from auctioning
allowances may also be used for the market introduction of
hydrogen and fuel cells. Of course, those proposals suppose that
the prices for CO2 allowances rise, meet expectations to rise
further and thus set incentives for long-term investment in new
energy solutions.
To a certain extent the text adopted by the European
Parilament already displays some of these features: power
generated with CCS technologies will be exempted from the
revised ETS. This would then also apply to hydrogen derived from
Table 1
Minimum rates applicable to motor fuels according to the EU energy taxation directive.
Minimum excise rates before 2004 Minimum excise rates from 1.1.2004 Minimum excise rates from 1.1.2010
Petrol (per 1000 l) 337 421 421
Unleaded petrol (per 1000 l) 287 359 359
Diesel (per 1000 l) 245 302 330
Kerosene (per 1000 l) 245 302 330
LPG (per 1000 l) 100 125 125
Natural gas 100 (per 1.000kg) 2.6 (per gigajoule) 2.6 (per gigajoule)
Source: EC (2007d).
Table 2
Minimum tax rates applicable to heating fuels and electricity.
Minimum excise rates before 2004 Minimum excise rates from 1.1.2004
(business use)
Minimum excise rates from 1.1.2004
(non-business use)
Diesel (per 1000 l) 18 21 21
Heavy fuel oil (per 1000kg) 13 15 15
Kerosene (per 1000 l) 0 0 0
LPG (per 1000 kg) 0 0 0
Natural gas (per gigajoule) – 0.15 0.3
Coal and coke (per gigajoule) – 0.15 0.3
Electricity (per MWh) – 0.5 1.0
Source: EC (2007d).
R. Bleischwitz, N. Bader / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 5388–53985392CCS processes. Based on ‘‘best-in-class-technology’’ benchmarks,
free allowances will furthermore be given to industries. Thus, the
most advanced and greenest hydrogen production processes could
be rewarded. In addition, 50% of the ETS revenues will be used
for ﬁnancing climate adaptation and mitigation measures. This
includes also research and development as well as demonstration
projects (EC, 2008e) and may thus also apply to hydrogen and fuel
cell development.3. EU regulatory policies
The EU level also impacts on some regulatory policies. Given
that some of these policies may inﬂuence the price of hydrogen
they can be seen as an essential part of the EU policy framework
for hydrogen promotion. In the following our paper will thus
analyze the EU policy in the ﬁeld of energy taxation and the
liberalization of the gas and electricity market.3.1. Taxation
Green taxation has received much academic attention in recent
years. Several studies have shown the effectiveness of environ-
mental taxes and emphasize that there still is potential for better
and wider use of these instruments (Glomm et al., 2008; Go¨rres
and Cottrell, 2008; OECD, 2006). Energy taxation in particular can
be an effective instrument of inﬂuencing demand if well applied
and combined with other instruments (Berkhout et al., 2004).
Consequently energy taxation has the potential to support or
hinder the development and market introduction of hydrogen and
fuel cell technologies.
The main EU instrument in the ﬁeld of fuel taxation is
the Council Directive 2003/96/EC aiming at ‘‘restructuring the
Community framework for the taxation of energy products
and electricity’’. Before the entry into force of this directive, EC
minimum tax rates applied only to mineral oils. The rationale for
this directive thus has been to apply minimum taxation also toelectricity, coal and natural gas and to reduce distortions of the
internal market due to different tax rates.
The directive sets out minimum levels of taxation for energy
products. The tax is paid by whoever purchases the energy
product in question and not by the producer. Electricity consumed
in the production of electricity, so-called on-site consumption is
exempted from the directive (EC, 2003a). The ﬁnal shape of the
Directive which entered into force on 1 January 2004 is
characterised by Hasselknippe and Christiansen (2003) as follows: New minimum rates are to be set at the latest by 1 January
2012 for a new period from 2013 The minimum rates are set at a relatively low level (see below)
 Some energy-intensive industries can beneﬁt from exemp-
tions; the tax rates for business and industry are generally
lower than those for other economic actors A return of revenue to companies/industries is possible if they
enter into energy efﬁciency agreements (100% return to
energy-intensive industries with agreement, 50% return to
other industries)
Tables 1 and 2The Directive on the minimum taxation of energy
products does not explicitly refer to hydrogen. Thus, in absence of
any European minimum taxation level, Member States have the
freedom to opt for the tax rate which they deem most appropriate
at national level. According to a study led by Bocconi University
(Chernyavs’ka et al., 2006), hydrogen is not taxed in a speciﬁc way
in 13 Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia,
Spain). Five Member States tax hydrogen when it is used as
motor fuel (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands,
United Kingdom). Seven Member States are not included in the
study for they did not reply to the research enquiry (Cyprus,
Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden).
An optimal tax in environmental terms aims at internalising
negative externalities. In this respect, it is important to calculate
not only the environmental costs of a given fuel at the end-use
stage but also at the production stage. Currently, hydrogen
R. Bleischwitz, N. Bader / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 5388–5398 5393production – in cases when it is produced via fossil fuels – causes
higher external costs than the production of competing fuels.
Hydrogen use, on the other hand, produces little or no external
costs (GHG emissions) and may substitute other environmentally
more harmful fuels and energy carriers. From a systems
perspective, there is no overall rationale for taxing hydrogen as
long as it contributes to lowering overall environmental pressure
of the energy system. However, this assessment depends upon the
assumption that hydrogen is produced in a sustainable way, for
instance through electrolysis based on renewable energy or gas
reforming combined with carbon capture and storage (Cher-
nyavs’ka et al., 2006).
European states which tax hydrogen impose only low rates.
Given that currently hydrogen is produced in a conventional
way using fossil fuels, the tax level for hydrogen is estimated to lie
below a level which would be needed to internalise its total
external costs (Chernyavs’ka et al., 2006). The current European
tax systems thus put hydrogen in a favourable position. In view of
the promotion of hydrogen in Europe, this situation is deﬁnitely
positive and should be maintained in the coming years. Member
States currently taxing hydrogen may also reﬂect and withdraw
from their taxation of hydrogen.
Looking ahead to the envisaged deployment, however, the
question of hydrogen taxation must be addressed. When hydrogen
applications pass the threshold from early markets to mass
markets, a comprehensive framework which promotes sustain-
able hydrogen productionwill be needed. It is likely that there will
be a trade-off between cost-effective production of hydrogen at a
large scale via gas reforming processes on the one hand and GHG
reduction and the aim to promote clean energies on the other
hand (Steinberger-Wilckens et al., 2008). Assuming that this
situation occurs after 2010, the EU will be faced with the dilemma
of having to implement its radical GHG commitments (20% by the
year 2020 based upon 1990 levels, more if other nations follow)
and large-scale production of hydrogen for which gas reforming
is the most cost-effective option (Ros et al., 2007). Taxation
thus needs to be put into the context of a long-term GHG
reduction after 2020 as well as other energy-related goals such
as competitiveness and energy security. If a priority in favour
of hydrogen is made, an – at least limited – exemption of gas
reforming from taxation (respectively the ETS) can be legitimate.3.2. The liberalization of the internal market for gas and electricity
The liberalisation of the European market for electricity and
gas is supposed to strengthen the competitiveness of European
ﬁrms and improve the efﬁciency of the energy market (Pelkmans,
2006; Delgado et al., 2007). Consumers should have greater choice
of energy suppliers and all energy suppliers should have access to
the market, irrespective of their market power and the energy
source. Thus, also small producers of sustainable energy technol-
ogies could better promote their products provided that the price
mechanisms reﬂect the external costs too; such liberalization
policy has e.g. proven to be effective in the promotion of
cogeneration in the UK (Tichy, 2008, p. 27).
However, in its conclusions of 9 March 2007 the Presidency of
the Council of the European Union stated that ‘‘a truly competi-
tive, interconnected and single Europe-wide internal energy
market [y] has not yet been achieved’’ (EC, 2007b). In view
of reaching this goal, the Council sees the need to ﬁrstly fully
implement existing directives. Secondly, further measures that go
beyond existing legislation are to be discussed and implemented.
The implementation of existing legislation refers mainly to two
directives of 2003, one on the internal market for natural gas, the
other on the internal market for electricity: The directives stipulate that for non-household customers
the markets for electricity and gas must be liberalised by 1 July
2004. The respective markets for the remaining customers, above all
private households, must be liberalised by 1 July 2007 (EC,
2007e; EC 2007f).Notwithstanding these already elapsed deadlines, the internal
markets for electricity and gas have not yet been fully liberalised
and actors still complain about the persistence of entry barriers
to the market. Thus, the Commission stated in a sector inquiry
of early 2007 that several problems need to be addressed and
respective policy responses to be implemented if the liberalisation
is to advance (EC, 2007g).
Among the proposed policy responses, unbundling (i.e. ‘‘the
effective separation of supply and production activities from
network operations’’) has caused particularly heated debate.
The Commission furthermore proposes to establish a European
‘‘Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators’’ which would
set the framework in which national regulators operate, oversee
the cooperation between transmission operators, take decisions
concerning cross-border issues and advise the Commission (EC,
2007h). Currently (January 2009) European politicians are debat-
ing these proposals (also called ‘‘the third energy package’’) of the
Commission.
From today’s perspective, it is difﬁcult to see which option may
eventually be retained. However, the reform models under
discussion are likely to increase competition on European markets
for electricity and gas supply and thus lead on the medium term
to lower prices—relative to a situation without policy change, not
in absolute terms. The liberalization of the gas and electricity
markets may thus have a certain even though not signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the level of the price curve. The overall price level
will also depend on other factors such as impacts from climate
policy and international markets for energy fuels. In addition, any
active competition policy favouring market entry is also likely
to have positive impacts on hydrogen and fuel cell companies
(for business development and ﬁnancing of hydrogen and fuel cell
companies see Mo¨nter and Doran, 2007).
At the current price level, hydrogen is not competitive with
most energy sources and energy carriers. One might therefore be
tempted to conclude that rising energy prices favour hydrogen
development as long as only prices of competing energy vectors
and sources increase and not that of hydrogen.
However, electricity and gas are two major inputs for hydrogen
production. If gas and electricity prices rise, the price for hydrogen
rises too. The price for hydrogen is thus dependent upon the gas
and electricity price. In absolute terms, hydrogen will always be
more expensive than gas and electricity as long as it is mainly
produced via electrolysis and gas reforming.
Yet, the price for gas and electricity may affect the way
hydrogen is produced. High prices for gas and electricity can be an
incentive for further research of alternative hydrogen production
processes, such as biological production.
Analysis is confronted with a different picture if one blanks out
hydrogen for stationary use and looks at hydrogen for transport
applications only. From an end user perspective hydrogen for
transport applications competes mainly with oil. Thus, the price of
hydrogen must be compared with the crude oil price. In a scenario
where the medium term increase in crude oil prices is higher than
the increase in prices for electricity and gas, hydrogenwill become
more competitive with regard to oil as a transport fuel (Martinot
et al., 2007). Any development with a conducive policy framework
that renders electricity and gas relatively cheaper with regard to
crude oil can therefore be seen as an incentive beneﬁtting the use
Table 3
Expenditure estimates for EU policies.
Expenditure estimates for EU policies (in
billion h)
Budget 2008 Change from
2007 (%)
Sustainable growth 58 5.7
Competitiveness, including 11.1 18.4
Education and training 1.0 9.3
Research 6.1 11.0
Competitiveness and Innovation 0.4 6.8
Energy and transport networks 1.9 92.5
Social policy agenda 0.2 8.0
Cohesion, including 46.9 3.1
Convergence 37.0 5.2
Regional competitiveness and
employment
8.6 5.1
Territorial cooperation 1.2 2.6
Natural resources, including 55.0 1.5
Environment 0.3 12.0
Agricultural expenditure and direct aid 40.9 3.4
Rural development 12.9 4.5
Fisheries 0.9 2.2
Freedom, security and justice 0.7 16.7
Citizenship 0.6 14.7
EU as a global player 7.3 7.3
Administration 7.3 4.4
Total 129.1 2.2
Source: EC (2008f).
R. Bleischwitz, N. Bader / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 5388–53985394of hydrogen in transport. It is worth noting that competition for
the market for clean cars and sustainable mobility will need to be
aligned with those policies (Table 3).4. EU spending policies
A glance at the EU budget may sufﬁce to highlight the relative
importance of spending policies. Out of the 129 billion hwhich the
EU planned to spend in 2008, around 100 billion h were foreseen
for the two biggest items on the budget sheet alone: cohesion and
natural resources (the latter referring mainly to the Common
Agricultural Policy).
In the following EU spending policies will be screened with
regard to their possible positive or negative effects on hydrogen
and fuel cells.4.1. Regional policy
The treaty stipulates that the Community should aim for
economic and social cohesion. The main policy destined to
respond to this challenge is the Community’s regional policy
which aims to lessen regional disparities. The latter have
drastically increased in recent years. The process of European
integration and market liberalisation, however, cannot be blamed
for social disparity as Pelkmans points out (Pelkmans, 2007). The
gap in wealth between poorest and richest regions has mainly
increased due to the enlargement of the Union which opened in
2004 its doors to new member states whose regions sometimes
represent only 50% of the average EU wealth (expressed in GDP
per capita in PPP).
Regional policy matters for the development of hydrogen and
fuel cells inasmuch as it channels billions of euros to European
regions. A great share of this money could potentially be used for
clean energy technologies. The growing importance of regional
policy is reﬂected in the fact that the share of regional spending
will increase to 36% of total EU spending by 2013 and represent
the amount of 308 billion h over the period 2007–2013. The major
part of this amount goes to the poorest regions since only thoseregions that have a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average
are eligible for all of the three main objectives of regional funding
(EC, 2007i). The ensuing spending policy will be of importance for
infrastructure investments of the hydrogen and fuel cell economy
in Europe (e.g. production and distribution).
In theory, a relatively big part of regional spending should be
channelled towards innovation. In its aim to re-launch the Lisbon
strategy and to mobilise all available resources, the Commission
has announced to promote growth and employment also through
regional policy instruments. In fact, the regional level of economic
and political governance plays a crucial role in innovation
processes (Rodrı´guez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2007). Thus, EU regional
funding should be concentrated on innovation, research, knowl-
edge and entrepreneurship (EC, 2007j) to be sure this enforces a
shift from a merely socially oriented policy towards a more
forward-looking approach. This shift can potentially beneﬁt the
hydrogen and fuel cell development in particular in regions with
existing hydrogen by-production and other capacities (see
Madsen and Andersen, 2009; Bader et al., 2008).
It is, however, very difﬁcult to assess the exact amount of
money that will be spent on hydrogen and fuel cells via the EU
regional funds given that a category ‘‘hydrogen and fuel cells’’
does not exist in the respective EU documents. In the following,
the planned spending on ‘‘innovation’’ will be analyzed since
instruments supporting the development of hydrogen and fuel
cells would most likely fall into this category. The Commission
deﬁnes spending in innovation in the wider sense as spending
that falls in one of the following four categories: research and
technological development, entrepreneurship, innovative ICT and
human capital. The spending for research and technological
development (such as the promotion of ‘‘environmental-friendly
products and processes’’) is ‘‘referred to as innovation in the
narrow sense’’ (EC, 2007j). The investment in entrepreneurship
(e.g. support for ﬁrms and start-ups), innovative ICT and human
capital should establish an environment conducive for growth and
help to reap the fruits of research activities. Innovative regions can
therefore facilitate the adoption of a new, potentially disruptive,
technology (Huber, 2004) such as hydrogen and fuel cells.
In the period 2000–2006, 11% of the EU cohesion spending was
dedicated to innovation. For 2007–2013, 25% (85 billion h) of the
envelope is planned to be channelled towards innovation. Given
that national and private co-ﬁnancing and additional investment
are not yet included, the actual sumwill be far greater (EC, 2007j).
The role of innovation in the cohesion spending has thus clearly
increased in the 2007–2013 ﬁnancial framework compared with
the previous one, albeit on a low level.
With regard to the three objectives of regional funding, the
Convergence objective is allocated by far the greatest ﬁnancial
resources: 282.8 billion h will be available under this heading
for the period 2007–2013. Around 61 billion h out of these 282.8
billion h are planned to be spent for innovation which represents
nearly 22% of the total allocation. However, only those regions
which have a GDP below 75% of the EU average are eligible for
cohesion funding. The most prosperous regions which are in many
cases also the most innovative regions are consequently not
eligible. Currently 84 regions representing 154 million inhabitants
can apply for cohesion funding (Fig. 2).
The increased spending for innovative measures can be seen as
very positive with regard to hydrogen development. However, it is
questionable whether the money is spent in the most effective
way. In fact, hydrogen and fuel cells have so far been deployed in
relatively innovative regions that dispose of the necessary capital,
the political will and technical know-how (see the article of
Madsen and Andersen, 2009). Yet, the Commission states itself
that ‘‘Cohesion policy concentrates its ﬁnancial support on the
poorer regions that are usually included in the group of regions
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Fig. 2. Planned investment in innovation 2007–2013 by country (all objectives). Source: EC (2007j).
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already gained some experience with hydrogen and fuel cells and
are well placed to pursue their development are often not eligible
for the major part of the spending—with a few notable exceptions
(e.g. in Spain, Southern Italy or Wales). Regional policy as it has
been pursued in the past might be an effective tool to bridge the
social gap in Europe. In future, more efforts need to be undertaken
to align regional policy with the deployment of hydrogen and fuel
cells. The scoping exercises of projects such as Roads2HyCom
provide tentative evidence on regions as well as tools that can be
used for more in-depth research.4.2. Biofuels policy
Like hydrogen and fuel cell technologies biofuels are often
referred to as ‘sustainable’ or ‘green’ alternatives to gasoline-
fuelled transport. Biofuels and hydrogen are therefore competing
for green credentials and future market shares in Europe. In this
respect, the promotion of biofuels can have repercussions on the
development of hydrogen and fuel cells.
Biofuels are also part of EU energy policies. The reason why
they are dealt within the context of spending policies is the fact
that the EU not only sets common targets but also sets ﬁnancial
incentives for biofuels production via the common agricultural
policy (CAP) and its regional policy.
In 2003, the EU set the indicativetarget to increase the share of
biofuels in transport to at least 5.75% by 2010. The rationale
underlying this target is the assumption that CO2 emissions in the
transport sector might decrease if biofuels partly substitute petrol
and diesel (EC, 2003b). According to the Green Paper ‘‘Towards a
European strategy for the security of energy supply’’ which was
published in 2000, the Commission aimed to increase the share of
alternative fuels in transport to 20% by 2020 (EC, 2000). The term
‘‘alternative fuels’’ also includes gas and hydrogen but biofuels
will have the main role to play if the Community is to reach this
goal. At the EU summit of March 2007, the Council set the speciﬁc
biofuels target even higher and proclaimed that it aims to reach a
10% share of biofuels in transport by 2020.In late 2007, the Community was still far away from reaching
this objective and it seemed unlikely that the goal of increasing
the share of biofuels to 5.75% by 2010 could be reached. A progress
report of 2007 shows that for 2010 a share of 4.2% seems more
likely. In fact, the EU 25 reached a biofuels share of only 1% in
2005. Yet, other studies, notably the EurObserv’Er (2007),
estimate that the EU member states may come close to their
targets (EC, 2007k; EurObserv’Er, 2007).
In recent months, the 10% target has been substantially
revised. Thus, the European Parliament refers in its resolution
of 17 December 2008 to a 10% share in transport which ‘‘is to be
achieved from renewable sources, not from biofuels alone’’. This
could include also hydrogen and green electricity. Moreover,
the Parliament calls for the development of ‘‘sustainability criteria
for biofuels and the development of second and third generation
biofuels in the European Union and worldwide’’ (EC, 2008e).
These changes reﬂect growing concerns about the sustainability of
biofuels. However, they do not fundamentally reverse the
promotion of biofuels in Europe.
Many Member States promote biofuels via reduced excise duty
rates on the ground of the 2003 directive on energy taxation
(Bringezu et al., 2007). In addition to the promotion of biofuels
by the means of common targets and tax exemptions, the EU also
supports its production through the CAP. The 1992 reform of the
CAP introduced the obligation for farmers to set aside a certain
surface of their farmland. Normally, this land must not be
cultivated. Yet, if a farmer produces crops for non-food use he is
allowed to resort to the set-aside area. Already in 2005, 0.85
million hectares of set-aside land served for growing oilseeds for
biofuel production. Since 2005, also sugar beet for biofuel can be
planted on set-aside land (EC, 2006b).
Since 2004 farmers can furthermore beneﬁt from a speciﬁc EU
premium for energy crops of up to 45 euros per hectare. This
incentive has worked so well that the area where energy crops
eligible for this funding were grown increased from 0.31 million
hectares in 2004 to 2.84 million hectares in 2007. The funding
per hectare has since then been decreased because the budget
ceiling for this instrument (90 million euros per year) was reached
(EC, 2007l). The EU furthermore supports investment and training
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Development policy (EC, 2006b).
With regard to its effect on hydrogen and fuel cells the
promotion of biofuels may facilitate the shift away from oil.
Biofuels are a relatively rapid answer to the growing concern
about security of supply, can be blended up to a certain degree
with traditional fossil fuels, are easily to introduce (no special
infrastructure needed) and might compensate for relative
shortages of oil.
Exactly because of these advantages, biofuels can become a
rival for hydrogen, at least in the mid term until 2020. However, it
is questionable whether biofuels can be a sustainable response to
the global energy challenges. First, they will not be able to fully
substitute for fossil fuels since the global production capacities
are limited by the land available and by shortages in other
production factors. Second, it is questionable whether biofuels
have such a good environmental footprint as its supporters
claim—there is increasing evidence of negative environmental
impacts (Bringezu et al., 2007; Patzek, 2007; House of Commons,
2008). Second-generation biofuels may have a better environ-
mental footprint than the ﬁrst generation. However, they are
expected to represent only a small share of biofuels produced in
2030 and still face considerable technical and economic chal-
lenges (OECD/IEA, 2008)
With regard to the carbon footprint hydrogen performs clearly
better when produced from renewable energy sources. Aligning
biofuels policy with concerns about sustainable energy, the
deployment of hydrogen and fuel cells and attempts to promote
rural development thus will become a major challenge for the
next years.5. Conclusions and proposals for further policy research
The analysis of EU policy impacts on the development of
hydrogen and fuel cells has yielded different results.(1) EU energy policies have developed strong push factors
towards more sustainable technologies. The ETS, energy
efﬁciency or renewables promotion—all these policy instru-
ments also have some positive impact on hydrogen and fuel
cells since they constitute a framework for sustainable energy
production and use. However, these push factors are too weak
to lead to the deployment of hydrogen and fuel cells because
of, ﬁrstly, lacking incentives towards long-term investments in
sustainable technologies and, secondly, inconsistencies and
negative side-effects within existing instruments that lead to
distortions in hydrogen and fuel cell markets across Europe.(2) Current regulatory policies tend to have a weak but positive
impact on hydrogen. In most EU member states hydrogen is
exempted from any taxation or taxed at relatively low rates.
Thus taxation currently favours hydrogen over competing
technologies. Yet, the EU cannot be credited with this
situation since hydrogen is not explicitly mentioned in the
directive on minimum taxation nor has the EU strong
competence in the ﬁeld of taxation. The effects of the
liberalization of the market for gas and electricity seem to
be relatively weak. Nonetheless, they are positive and may in
general favour the market entry of hydrogen and fuel cells and
in particular the use of hydrogen in transport.(3) EU spending policies are a potentially powerful policy
instrument for the regional promotion of sustainable tech-
nologies and infrastructure since they can channel funds
towards them. However, this potential is currently not fully
exploited. The analysis of regional policy yields a mixed result.
On the one hand more regional funding has recently beendirected towards innovation, a ﬁeld closely related to hydro-
gen and fuel cells. On the other hand, cohesion funding
normally does not apply to those regions which are the most
innovative and the most advanced in the ﬁeld of hydrogen and
fuel cells. The CAP as the second big EU spending policy does
not favour hydrogen or fuel cells. On the contrary it promotes
biofuels which may on the long term compete with hydrogen
and thus indirectly hinder its development.Looking ahead the current policy framework at EU level does
not set clear long-term signals and lacks incentives that are strong
enough to facilitate high investment in and deployment of
sustainable energy technologies. The likely overall effect thus
seems to be too weak to enable the EU hydrogen and fuel cell
deployment strategy. According to our analysis an enhanced EU
policy framework pushing for sustainability in general and the
development of hydrogen and fuel cells in particular should meet
the following key requirements:(1) A strong EU energy policy with credible long-term targets:
The European governments have given their commitments for
a strong reduction in GHG. However, the implementation
must be improved and requires additional action. This implies
for example higher carbon prices that set clear investment
signals, higher energy efﬁciency requirements and a more
ambitious implementation of renewable energy targets
at national level. In addition, targets for the years
2030–2040–2050 need to be formulated and aligned with
the hydrogen and fuel cell deployment strategy (see also
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, p. 840 on the importance of long
time scales to transform the energy sector).(2) Better coordination of EU policies: Europe needs a common
understanding of key taxation concepts (green taxation,
internalization of externalities) and a common approach for
the market introduction of new energy technologies. This
requires more harmonization of tax systems, codes and
standards. To promote its development hydrogen and its
production sources could be exempted from any taxation for a
certain period of time. In the mid to long run when mass
markets for hydrogen are forming, it will however become
rational to include hydrogen in any minimum taxation
Directive or to reform this system taking into account the
total external costs of the life cycle of respective energy
products. However, policy consistency is of great importance
in this respect. Liberalization of the gas and electricity
markets should be pursued in line with putting a price on
carbon and improving market access for small producers of
renewable energy sources. Entrepreneurs and SMEs in hydro-
gen and fuel cell sector should get better access to ﬁnancing,
for example through a European trust fund. The sustainability
impact of spending policies furthermore needs to be in-
creased: setting up a distribution infrastructure for hydrogen
and fuel cells will be facilitated if active regions in the ﬁeld of
hydrogen and fuel cells promote large-scale demonstration
projects and become eligible for the main regional funds.(3) Regions that dispose of strong clusters in hydrogen and fuel
cell-related areas can further advance the market introduction
and establish a ﬁrst hydrogen infrastructure. Later on the ﬁrst
emerging hydrogen communities could be interconnected to
create a wider hydrogen infrastructure in Europe. The EU can
support these efforts and play a coordinating role (for the
regional perspective see Madsen and Andersen, 2009).Long-term policies need to be adaptive and open to techno-
logical change. Alternative developments e.g. battery technology
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(Larsen and Ho¨jer, 2007; Macario, 2007). In the short and medium
term other technologies may well be more promising than
hydrogen and fuel cells. Plug-in hybrid cars are for instance
already commercialized in Europe and North America and are
expected to highly increase their market share in the coming
decade (Wyman, 2008)—it is far from being clear how hydrogen
and fuel cells will perform in comparison to these technologies. In
the end, this clearly points out the need for a more in-depth
research on a comprehensive long-term policy framework that
induces and enables sustainable energy systems and other eco-
innovations.
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